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Abstract
This article considers a new concept of social optimum for an econ-
omy populated by agents with heterogeneous discount factors. It is based
upon an approach that constrains decision rules to be temporally con-
sistent: these are stationary and unequivocally ruled by the state vari-
able. For agents who differ only in their discount factors and have equal
weights in the planner’s objective, the temporally-consistent optimal so-
lution produces identical consumption for the agents at all time periods.
In the long run, the capital stock is determined by a modified golden
rule that corresponds to an average-like summation of all discount fac-
tors. The general argument is illustrated by various two-agent examples
that allow for an explicit determination of the temporally consistent de-
cision rules. Interestingly, this temporally consistent solution can be
simply recovered from the characterization of a social planner’s problem
with variable discounting and can also be decentralised as a competitive
equilibrium through the use of various instruments.
Keywords: Time-Consistent Policy Rules, Heterogeneous Discounting
Programs.
JEL Classification: E, O.
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I. Introduction
This article introduces a model with infinitely-lived heterogenous agents who differ from
their discount factors. Consider an associated benevolent planner that is made of succes-
sive incarnations1 with the incarnation of date t in charge of the decisions for that period.
The objective of the date t-incarnation of the planner is a weighted sum of the inter tem-
poral utilities of the agents starting from date t. For heterogenous discount factors, the
objectives of these successive incarnations being mutually inconsistent, this article intro-
duces a characterization of a temporally consistent solution that results from the strategic
game defined between these different incarnations. This solution is arguably more robust
than the commonly considered one that consists in retaining the initial objective of the
date -incarnation and assuming that it is to take the decisions for the whole horizon of
dates. Indeed, all of his future decisions would be questioned by the future incarnations
of the planner.
Models with heterogenous agents who differ in their valuation of the future have appeared
in a large literature that has focused on the features of the associated inter-temporal
equilibrium. The so-called Ramsey Conjecture—Ramsey [17]—was rigorously proved by
Bewley [4] and Becker [1], and states that only the most patient of the agents ends up
with positive consumption in the long run, with all other agents having zero consumption.
Through the introduction of imperfect financial markets that rule out indebtedness, R.
Becker [1] established that the long-run equilibrium exhibits the following properties: the
most patient of agents holds the whole capital stock of the economy and has consumption
that exceeds his wage income.2 On the contrary, all the other agents have consumption
levels corresponding to their wage income. Extending the results of Bewley [4], Coles [8]
and Coles [9] prove turnpike theorems when agents have different rates of time preference
in multi-sectoral growth models.
The assumption of agents who differ in their valuation of the future and their discount
rates has led to numerous further developments. Becker & Foias [3] and Sorger [18] have
also introduced strategic dimensions into the frameworks formally related to the imperfect
financial market structure of Becker [1].
It should however be stressed that all these contributions have focused on the competi-
tive equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, only Becker [2] and Le Van & Vailakis
[13] have lifted the veil on the properties of the social optimum and the benevolent plan-
ner with heterogeneous discount factors. These contributions assume that the planner
maximizes at an initial date a weighted sum of the inter-temporal utilities of the agents
under the resource constraint of the economy. Under this assumption, the weight of the
most impatient agent in the planner’s objective should become arbitrarily small in the
long run. The optimum tends towards a stationary state in which only the most patient
agent consumes a positive amount. The long-run capital stock will be determined by a
modified golden rule that corresponds to the discount factor of the most patient agent.
1This term incarnations echoes for the social planner the use of selves for the consumer in the literature
on temporally inconsistent preferences.
2It is worth mentioning that the Ramsey conjecture does not survive in a stochastic environment—Becker
and Zilcha [5]—or in settings with recursive but not necessarily additively separable preferences—Epstein [6]
and Epstein [7].
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It is worth emphasizing that the results here mimic those in the competitive equilibrium.
One difficulty with this approach is that this solution is not time-consistent (and is thus
not robust). Assume indeed that the date t-incarnation of the social planner maximises a
weighted sum of the inter-temporal utilities of the agents from t on; the reconsideration of
this program by a later incarnation of the social planner would yield a different solution.
The current contribution suggests another approach that is temporally consistent. The
decision rules of the successive incarnations of the social planner are constrained to be
stationary and unequivocally ruled by the state variable (the aggregate capital stock).
This approach dramatically changes the conclusions. For two agents who differ only in
their discount factors and have equal weights in the planner’s objective, the temporally-
consistent optimal solution predicts identical consumptions for both agents at any time
period.
A generalization is presented with an unrestricted population of n agents who differ in their
discount factors and instantaneous utility functions, with various differentiated weights
being considered in the social planner’s criterion. The resulting properties are close to
those in the two-agent model, with all of the agents benefitting from positive consumption
in the long run. The capital stock is determined by a modified golden rule which depends
on the whole set of discount factors of the agents in the economy.
The general argument is illustrated via various two-agent examples. A first one considers
a Cobb-Douglas production technology and a logarithmic utility function. The framework
allows for the explicit determination of the decision rules of the two individuals together
with a comparison to the results in Becker [2]. A second example is then developed,
based on an iso-elastic instantaneous utility function and a linear production technology.
The explicit determination of decision rules continues to hold in environments that enable
the emergence of endogenous growth solutions. For the temporally-consistent optimal
solution, the consumptions of both agents increase at the same rate. On the contrary,
in the time-inconsistent solution, the consumption of the most patient agent increases at
higher rates than does that of the most impatient agent. Finally, considering the special
case of a logarithmic utility function, it is also possible to calculate the explicit values of
the inter-temporal utilities of the two agents, both for the time-consistent solution and the
standard optimal solution. In this example, even though it is established that the most
impatient agent benefits from higher utility in the time-consistent solution, total welfare
in the time consistent solution is lower than that in the standard optimum.
It is also proved that the temporally consistent solution can be simply recovered from the
characterization of a standard social planner’s problem with a recursive objective function
and a variable discounting term. This term is a weighted sum of the agents’ discount
factors. Interestingly, and for the earlier simple parametric examples, the discounting
term is constant and an explicit form becomes available for the value function of the social
planner. The final part of our work illustrates how a time-consistent optimal solution can
be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium through the use of three instruments, namely
distortionary taxation on the capital stock that is specific to each agent, the issuance of
public debt, and an initial transfer of wealth between agents. Moreover, at the steady
state the relatively impatient agent should be subsidized while the relatively patient one
should be taxed.
Section II introduces the basic solution concept for the case of two agents, and then enlarges
ii 
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the analysis to n agents who may differ in both their discount factors and their instanta-
neous utility functions, the analysis being completed by introducing different weights in
the social planner’s objective function. Section III investigates three examples, Section
IV explains how the solution concept can be simply recovered from the characterization
of a standard social planner’s program with variable discounting and Section V eventu-
ally addresses the decentralization of the time-consistent optimal solution. All proofs are
brought together in a final appendix.
II. The Argument
II.1 A first intuition in a basic framework with two agents
Time is discrete. The economy consists of two infinitely-lived individuals indexed by i ∈
{, } who differ in their discount factors. Let then {cit}, t ∈ IN, denote the consumption
sequence of agent i, for cit ∈ IR+. His preferences are represented by an inter-temporal
utility function of the following kind:
U
({
cit}
)
=
+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t
u
(
cit
)
This economy includes a competitive representative firm with a production function
F
(
Kt,Lt
)
, with Kt the capital stock at date t ∈ IN that depreciates at the rate η ∈ ], [,
and Lt the quantity of labour at that same date. All individuals inelastically offer / units
of labour, so that the global amount that is offered sums to . The resource constraint is
as follows for the economy at a given date t ∈ IN:
() Kt+ = F
(
Kt, ) + (− η)Kt −
∑
i=
cit.
In both Le Van and Vailakis [13] and Becker [2], the objective function of the planner is
the sum of the inter-temporal utility functions of the two agents up to date :
()
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
(
δi
)t
u
(
cit
)
The planner determines the optimal sequences of
{
ct
}
and
{
ct
}
by maximizing at date
t =  the objective () under the resource constraint (). The preceding objective function
accordingly can be rewritten as:
()
+∞∑
t=
(
δ
)t[
u
(
ct
)
+
(
δ/δ
)t
u
(
ct
)]
As δ < δ, the component
(
δ/δ
)t asymptotically converges to zero for infinite values of
t. The weight associated to the consumption of the relatively impatient agent , namely
ct , then becomes negligible for large values of t. Becker [2] and Le Van & Vailakis [13] in
their Proposition 8 indeed find that consumption ct converges to  in the long run.
Consider instead that the planner builds from successive incarnations, the date-t incar-
nation being in charge of the decisions for period t. Such an approach mimics the one
iii 
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on the literature on time-inconsistent preferences initiated by Strotz [19] and Phelps and
Pollack [16]. Compare the objectives of two distinct incarnations of the social planner.
First consider the date -incarnation objective function given by (). Then consider the
date t-incarnation of the social planner. The intertemporal utility function of agent i from
t on is:
+∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τ
u
(
cit+τ
)
.
The objective of the incarnation by date t of the social planner hence becomes:
()
+∞∑
τ=
∑
i=
(
δi
)τ
u
(
cit+τ
)
.
In the first formulation () of the objective, the period-t element is
(
δ
)t[
u
(
ct
)
+(
δ/δ
)t
u
(
ct
)]
. However, with formulation (), it is ∑i= u(cit). This proves that, as
a direct byproduct of the heterogeneity of discount factors amongst the individual agents,
the objective of the incarnation at date t of the social planner is not consistent with the
one of its incarnation at date . Otherwise stated, would the incarnation at date  of the
social planner be in position to take the whole sequence of decisions from date  to +∞,
he would select for date t a class of decisions that differ from its incarnation at date t.
Heterogeneity in discount factors hence leads to temporal inconsistency in the sequential
incarnations of the planner’s choices.
In opposition to this, the cornerstone of the current analysis is the imposition of temporal
consistency for the choices of successive planners. By assumption, decision rules will
be functions that unequivocally depend on the state variable—the capital stock—under
consideration:
cit = θ
i
C
(
Kt
)
.
The solution then comes from a strategic game between the successive incarnations of the
planner: the incarnation at date t determines the best resource allocation at t, having
taken into account that all future incarnations of the planner will apply the strategy
cit+τ = θ
i
C
(
Kt+τ
)
. This assumption hence ensures time consistency in the optimal choices
of the successive social planners.
The solution concept for this game is similar to the one that was used in the literature
on time inconsistency of the consumer problem initiated by Phelps and Pollack [16]. The
social planner is therein viewed as successive incarnations and the decision at date t is taken
by the t-th incarnation. Phelps and Pollack [16] went on labelling their equilibrium concept
as a Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. In the recent literature on hyperbolic discounting, various
names have however been used for this same solution concept. Judd [11] introduces the
seemingly most precise terminology for this equilibrium that is referred as a continuous
differentiable Nash equilibrium. Such a terminology singles out the focus on smooth
functions that remained implicit in most of the articles of the literature. The most common
name for this solution concept is however the one of Markov equilibrium—vid., e.g, Harris
and Laibson [10] or Krussel and Smith [12]. It is also to be mentioned that this solution
concept is at times referred in an intuitive way as describing a sophisticated behaviour.
iv 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.82
As the solution
(
θC
(
Kt
)
,θC
(
Kt
))
is constrained to be temporally consistent, it is consistent
with the case in which the planner reconsiders the maximization program every time
period. For a maximization at date t , the instantaneous reward by that period is u
(
ct
)
+
u
(
ct
)
while the associated costs are ct + ct . The optimal time-consistent solution will
naturally be associated with two identical consumptions: θC
(
Kt
)
= θC
(
Kt
)
for any Kt >
. In particular, the long-run consumption of the relatively impatient agent no longer
asymptotically tends to .
II.2 A Generalized Structure
Consider now an environment with n heterogeneous agents who first differ in their instan-
taneous utility function ui(·), i ∈ {, , . . . , n}:
Assumption P1. ui(·) is defined on IR+, of class C , with Dui(ci) > 3, Dui(ci) < , for
ci >  and Dui() = +∞, Dui(+∞) = , δi ∈ ], [, i ∈ {, , . . . , n}.
Agents are also ranked according to their discount factors:
Assumption P2.  > δ > δ > · · · > δn > .
Finally, agents’ utilities are weighted by factors λ, . . . , λn in the objective of the benevolent
planner. The productive sector remains unmodified with respect to the basic argument of
section II.1 and the production technology satisfies:
Assumption T1.: F(K,L) is a function of class C , homogeneous of degree one, increases
with K as DKF(K, ) > , and is concave with D

KKF(K, ) <  for K > . Moreover,
DKF(, ) > /δn − (− η) and DKF(+∞, ) < /δ − (− η).
The resource constraint is:
() Kt+ = F
(
Kt, ) + (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit.
Let θiC
(
Kt
)
denote the consumption decision rule for agent i, while Ji
(
Kt
)
is the resulting
payoff function, defined as:
() Ji
(
Kt
)
=
+∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τ
ui
[
θiC
(
Kt+τ
)]
, i ∈ {, , . . . , n},
for
{
Kt+τ
}
τ> recursively defined through Kt+τ+ = F
(
Kt+τ, 
)
+ ( − η)Kt+τ −∑n
i= θ
i
C
(
Kt+τ
)
.
Assumption T2.: Ji(Kt), i ∈ {, , . . . , n} is a well-defined function from IR+ into IR,
that is of class C , strictly increasing and concave.
Consider then:
W
(
Kt
)
=
n∑
i=
λiJ
i(Kt),(a)
3The notation Dui(ci) = ∂ui(ci)/∂ci will be retained throughout the text.
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W∆
(
Kt
)
=
n∑
i=
λiδiJ
i(Kt),(b)
for ∆ :=
(
δ, δ, . . . , δn
)
that denotes the vector of heterogeneous discount rates. The
consumption decision rules now emerge as the solutions to the following program:
W
(
Kt
)
= max
{cit}
{ n∑
i=
λiu
i
(
cit
)
+ W∆
(
Kt+
)
s.t. Kt+ = F
(
Kt, ) + (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit
}
.
The first-order conditions are then:
() λiDui
(
cit
)
= DW∆
(
Kt+
)
for any i ∈ {, , . . . , n}.
This in turn implies that the following relationship between two heterogeneous individuals
holds:
() λiDui
(
cit
)
= λjDuj
(
cjt
)
for any i, j.
The resource constraint () and consumption decision rules θiC
(
Kt
)
allow us to determine
the investment decision rule as
() θK
(
Kt
)
= F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
θiC
(
Kt
)
.
Remark II.1. If λi = λj and ui = uj for any i, j, we have that cit = cjt . All consumptions
are equal at all periods, even for agents who differ in their discount rates.
Remark II.2. For an iso-elastic parametric formulation of the individual utilities ui(ci) =(
ci
)−/ξ
/
(
−/ξ), ξ 6= , the above relations between the individual agents lead to cit/cjt =(
λi/λj
)ξ. The ratio between the consumption of the two agents will be constant, a property
that is at odds with the results in Becker [2] and Le Van and Vailakis [13].
Lemma II.1..— All of the functions θK
(
Kt
)
and θiC
(
Kt
)
, i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, that feature the
investment and consumption policy rules are of class C  and are increasing .
The envelope condition is derived as:
() DW
(
Kt
)
= DW∆
(
Kt+
)[
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)].
For any individual i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, the derivative of the payoff function is:
DJi
(
Kt
)
= Dui
[
θiC
(
Kt
)]
DθiC
(
Kt
)
+ δiDθK
(
Kt
)
DJi
(
Kt+
)
.()
At this stage, it is however worth noting that as none of the functions θiC
(
Kt
)
is an optimal
solution for the problem of any of the individuals, there is no possibility of eliminating
DθiC
(
Kt
)
between the above equations and recovering a Euler-type equation.
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II.3 The Long-Run Stationary State
The existence of a stationary state is assumed and associated with constant values for the
investment K = θK(K) and consumption ci = θiC
(
K) decision rules. A stationary state
satisfies the following conditions:
n∑
i=
θiC(K) = F(K, )− ηK,(a)
λiDui
[
θiC(K)
]
= DW∆(K),(b)
DW(K) =
[
DKF(K, ) + − η
]
DW∆(K),(c)
DJi(K) =
{
− δiDθK(K)
}−
Dui
[
θiC(K)
]
DθiC(K),(d)
DW(K) =
n∑
i=
λiDJ
i
(K),(e)
DW∆(K) =
n∑
i=
λiδiDJ
i
(K).(f)
θK
(
K
)
= F
(
K, 
)
+ (− η)K−
n∑
i=
θiC
(
K
)
.(g)
While equation (a) corresponds to the steady-state expression of the resource constraint
(), equation (b) features the first-order condition for the individual agent (). Equation
(c) gives the envelope condition (), while equation (d) is the steady-state value of
inter-temporal utility for agent i (). Last, equations (e) and (f) result from the
definition of the functions W(·) and W∆(·) when they are considered at the steady state
and (g) results from equation ().
Proposition II.1.— Under the previous assumptions, consider a steady state:
(i) The steady-state marginal productivity of the capital stock is a solution to a gener-
alized modified golden rule for which all of the discount factors come into play:{ n∑
i=
δiDθiC(K)
− δi[DKF(K, ) + − η−∑ni= DθiC(K)]
}[
DKF(K, ) + (− η)
]
=
{ n∑
i=
DθiC(K)
− δi[DKF(K, ) + − η−∑ni= DθiC(K)]
}
.
(ii) Marginal productivity belongs to the interval
]
/δ, /δn[.
Proposition II.1 illustrates how the steady-state economy exhibits a modified golden rule
that corresponds to an average discount parameter /δ ∈ ]/δ, /δn[: the long-run is no
longer unequivocally determined by the most patient agent.
Remark II.3. The stationary state depends upon DθiC(K), i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, the expressions
of which are unknown. Some subsequent examples shall however illustrate special cases for
which there are explicit formulations for the consumption decision rules and thus for the
other components at the steady state.
vii 
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Remark II.4. Assuming that the temporally-consistent solution to the planner’s problem
converges to a limit state K with c = θiC(K), i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, the latter will correspond to a
stationary state. Starting from K = K, given a set of decision rules that are unequivocally
determined by the state, the economy will not depart from this state. Interestingly, this
property contrasts with that in Le Van & Vailakis [13], whose analysis is based on a solution
that is not time-consistent.
III. Illustrations and Welfare Comparisons
III.1 A First Example
This is directly adapted from Becker [2]. The economic environment consists of two
agents with logarithmic instantaneous utility functions u(c) = ln(c) and a production
technology of the Cobb-Douglas variety with F(K, ) = AKα, α ∈ ], [ and A > , the
rate of depreciation of the capital stock being unitary over a given period. The objective
of the planner is assumed to be: W(K) = ∑i= λiJi(K), for λi ∈ ], [ and ∑i= λi = .
Proposition III.1.— Consider an economy with log preferences and Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology:
(i) the payoff functions of the two individuals are as follows:
Ji
(
Kt
)
=
α
− αδi ln
(
Kt
)
+ bi,
for some constant parameter bi;
(ii) the consumption and investment decision rules are:
cit =
λiA
(
Kt
)α
+ μ
,
Kt+ = A
(
Kt
)α μ
+ μ
,
for μ =
∑
i= λiδiai;
(iii) the capital stock converges to a value K such that:
AKα− =
∑
i= λi/
(
− αδi
)∑
i= λiαδi/
(
− αδi
) ;
This range of results may then fruitfully be compared to those in Becker [2]. The stationary
state there corresponds to the modified golden rule of the most patient agent:
AKα− = 
αδ
,
the consumption of the impatient agent  converges asymptotically to . On the contrary,
here the long-run steady state corresponds to the modified golden rule associated with a
value δ ∈ ]δ, δ[, in which both agents have positive consumption in all periods.
More specifically and for λi = /, the two agents’ consumptions are equal: ct = ct for
any t ∈ IN. Comparing the equations for the long-run value of K, it can further be shown
that DθK(K) = DKF(K, )− DθC(K) = α.
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III.2 A Growth Example
The economy here consists of two agents with common iso-elastic instantaneous utility
functions u(c) = (c)−/ς/( − /ς), ς 6=  and a linear production technology F(K, ) =
AK, with A > , the rate of depreciation of the capital stock being unitary over a given
period and η = . The planner’s objective is again given by W(K) = ∑i= λiJi(K), for
λi ∈ ], [,
∑
i= λi = .
Proposition III.2.— Consider the environment with iso-elastic utilities and a linear
production technology under the assumption that δA
(ς−)/ς
< :
(i) the payoff functions of the two individuals are given by:
Ji
(
Kt
)
=

− /ς
(
λi
μ
)ς−(
Kt
)−/ς( A
B(μ)
)(ς−)/ς
× 
− δi(A/B(μ))(ς−)/ς
, i ∈ {, },
where B(μ) = +∑i=(λi/μ)ς and μ is the unique solution to the following equation:
μς =
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς δi
(B(μ)/A)(ς−)/ς − δi
;
(ii) the consumption and decision rules that are obtained as solutions to the temporally-
inconsistent optimisation program at date  are:
cit+τ =
(
λi
μ
)ς( A
B(μ)
)τ+
Kt, i ∈ {, },
Kt+τ =
( A
B(μ)
)τ
Kt.
(iii) the consumption levels at the temporally-inconsistent solution are:
cit =
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςtAς(t+)K∑+∞
τ=
∑
j=
(
λj
)ς(
δj
)τςA(ς−)(τ+) , i ∈ {, }.
For the temporally-consistent optimal solution, the two agents’ consumptions exhibit an
identical growth rate. On the contrary, at the temporally-inconsistent solution the con-
sumption of the relatively patient agent rises at a higher rate than that of the relatively
impatient agent.
III.3 A Welfare Comparison with the Temporally-Inconsistent Optimal Decision
Solution in a Simple Linear Case
To cut down on the calculations, this illustration is based on a slightly simplified version
of the preceding growth example in which ς = .
Proposition III.3.— Consider an environment with logarithmic preferences and a linear
production technology.
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(i) For the most patient agent, the payoff of the time-invariant solution J
(
K
)
is lower
than that in the optimal time-inconsistent solution U, the difference being given
by:
J
(
K
)
−U = δ(
− δ
){ln[∑j=[λjδj/(− δj)]∑
j=
[
λj/
(
− δj
)] ]− ln(δ)} < .
(ii) For the most impatient agent, the payoff of the time-invariant solution J
(
K
)
is
higher than that in the optimal time-inconsistent solution U, the difference being
given by:
J
(
K
)
−U = δ(
− δ
){ln[∑j=[λjδj/(− δj)]∑
j=
[
λj/
(
− δj
)] ]− ln(δ)} > .
(iii) Total welfare in the time-consistent solution is lower than that in the optimal time-
inconsistent solution as
∑
i= λi
[
Ji
(
K
)
−Ui
]
< .
IV. Recovering the Time Consistent Optimal Solution through a
Standard Discounted Optimisation Problem
The results of Sections II and III showed that the consideration of a temporally consis-
tent solution with heterogenous discounting leads to an inter temporal trade-off that is
determined by a weighted average of the discount factors of the agents. This section will
provide some basis to such an intuition.
Consider the following benevolent planner program:
max
{cit}
+∞∑
t=
∆t
n∑
i=
λiu
i
(
cit
)
(P)
s.t. Kt+ = F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit,
K given,
with
(
∆t
)
t∈ IN a sequence defined by ∆ =  and ∆t+ = δt∆t and (δt)t∈ IN a sequence such
that, for every t > ,  < δn 6 δt 6 δ <  and limt→+∞δt = δ. The problem (P) features
a standard concave planner’s problem with a discount factor δt that is time-dependent in
the vein of Mitra [14]. The following lemma characterizes the solution to this program:
Lemma IV.1.— The optimal solution of the program (P) is characterized by a sequence(
cit,Kt
)
t∈ IN, K given, such that, for every i, j ∈ {, . . . , n} and for every t ∈ IN:
λiDui
(
cit
)
= λjDuj
(
cjt
)
,(a)
Dui
(
cit−
)
= δt−
[
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ − η]Dui(cit),(b)
limt→+∞∆tDui
(
cit
)[
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ − η]Kt = ,(c)
Kt+ = F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit,(d)
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The following proposition establishes that the temporally consistent solution(
K∗t , ci∗t
)
t∈ IN,i∈{,...,n} can be recovered as a solution to the planner’s program (P) for
a well-chosen sequence of discount factors
(
δt
)
t>.
Proposition IV.1.— Assume that the sequence (K∗t , ci∗t )t∈ IN,i∈{,,...,n} is a temporally
consistent solution of the problem of Section II and that it converges to a non-zero sta-
tionary state
(
K∗, ci∗
)
i∈{,,...,n}. This sequence is a solution to the problem (P) for a
sequence of discount factors
(
δt
)
t∈ IN such that:
() δt =
DW∆
(
K∗t+
)
DW
(
K∗t+
) ·
Proposition IV.1 establishes how it is possible to recover the temporally consistent solution
as a solution to a standard planner’s program whose discount factor would correspond to
a weighted average of the discount factors of the different agents:
δt =
DW∆
(
K∗t
)
DW
(
K∗t
)
=
n∑
i=
δi
 λiDJi(K∗t+)∑n
j= λjDJ
j(K∗t+)
 ,
where it is noticed that the weighting coefficients λiDJ
i(K∗t+)/∑nj= λjDJj(K∗t+) are
time-dependent in the general case.
However, as a special case and for the examples of Sections III.1 and III.2, the functions
DJi
(
Kt
)
being homogeneous, this results in a value for the coefficient δt of Proposition IV.1
that simplifies to a constant value δ. Within such a configuration, it is further possible to
prove that the value function of the program
(
P
)
is the function W
(
Kt
)
up to a constant.
Corollary IV.1.— In the framework of Example III.1, the discount factor of the social
planner is given by:
δ =
∑
i=
δi
λi/(− αδi)∑
j=
[
λj/(− αδj)
] ·
Moreover, the value function of the social planner (P) is given by
∑
i=
αλi
− αδi ln
(
Kt
)
+ b.
This result illustrates how, in the specific case of Example III.1, the planner’s problem
(P) leads to a value function that is just given by W
(
Kt
)
. This (P) program corresponds
to the one solved by a social planner that would explicitly incorporate into its decision
criterion a weighted average of the discount factors of the two agents.
V. Decentralizing the Time-Consistent Optimal Solution
This final section proves that the temporally consistent solution of the previous sections
can be decentralized, and thus recovered as an equilibrium. This requires three different
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elements: distortionary taxation on the capital stock that is particular to each individual;
the issuance of public debt; and a system of initial wealths transfers between individuals.
Let Xit, i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, t ∈ IN, denote the individual taxation coefficient on the capital
stock, i.e., the fraction of capital and the interest on capital that are left to agent i. The
agent is thus subsidized for Xit >  but taxed for X
i
t < . The amount of debt issued at
t ∈ IN is denoted by bt, ait represents the wealth held at the end of period t−  by agent
i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, and Ti denotes the initial wealth transfers for this agent.
At the initial date t = , any individual i ∈ {, , . . . , n} possesses wealth ai and it is
assumed that all agents hold the total amount of the capital stock so that K =
∑n
i= a
i
.
After transfers, the wealth of i changes to ai + T
i
, with all agents holding the capital
stock K and the initial debt b. Last, wt and Rt denote the competitive values of the
wage and interest rates at date t ∈ IN. A competitive equilibrium with capital taxation,
initial wealth transfers and debt is then defined in the following statement:
Definition V.1. — An equilibrium is characterized by a sequence(
ait, c
i
t,Kt, wt,Rt
)
t∈ IN,i∈{,,...,n}, a sequence of policy instruments
(
Xit, bt
)
t∈ IN,i∈{,,...,n}
and initial transfers
(
Ti
)
i∈{,,...,n} such that, for any t ∈ IN and for any i ∈ {, , . . . , n}:
Dui
(
cit
)
RtX
i
tδi = Dui
(
cit−
)
,(a)
ait+ = RtX
i
ta
i
t + wt − cit,(b)
ai = RX
i
(a
i
 + T
i
) + w − ci,(c)
+∞∑
t=
[
cit
/ t∏
τ=
(
RτX
i
τ
)]
= ai + T
i
 +
+∞∑
t=
[
wt
/ t∏
τ=
(
RτX
i
τ
)]
,(d)
b =
n∑
i=
Ti,(e)
bt+ = Rtbt − Rt
n∑
i=
(−Xit)ait,(f)
b = Rb − R
n∑
i=
(−Xi)(ai + T
i
), t > ,(g)
Kt+ = F(Kt, ) + (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit, t > ,(h)
n∑
i=
ait = Kt + bt, t > ,(i)
n∑
i=
(ai + T
i
) = K + b,(j)
wt = (/n)DLF(Kt, ) and Rt = DKF(Kt, ) + − η.(k)
with K, ai, i ∈ {, , . . . , n} given such that K =
∑n
i= a
i
.
In the above definition, (a) is the Euler equation, (b) the instantaneous budget con-
straint of agent i ∈ {, , . . . , n} and (c) this same constraint at the initial period t = .
Equation (d) is the inter-temporal budget constraint, including the initial wealth transfer
and the tax on capital. Equation (e) is the initial value of the debt corresponding to the
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sum of the transfers, while equation (f) depicts the budget constraint of the government
at date t and (g) this same constraint at the initial date t = . Equation (h) repre-
sents the equilibrium of the goods market at date t ∈ IN, equation (i) the equilibrium
on the capital market at the same date, and equation (j) this capital market equilibrium
at the initial date. Finally, equation (k) defines the equilibrium wage rate—henceforth
w(K)—and the equilibrium return on the capital stock—henceforth R(K). As usual, one
of the defining relationships of the equilibrium is redundant: for example, equation (h)
comes from the recombination of the other relationships.
Letting then
(
K∗t , ci∗t
)
t∈IN, i∈{,,...,n} denote the optimal temporally-consistent solution, the
following statement holds:
Proposition V.1.— Consider the equilibrium of Definition IV.1.
(i) The temporally-consistent solution
(
K∗t , ci∗t
)
t∈IN, i∈{,,...,n} can be decentralized
through the policy instruments as
Xit =

δi
DW∆
(
K∗t
)
DW
(
K∗t
) ,(a)
Ti =
+∞∑
t=
ci∗t∏t
τ=
[
R
(
K∗τ
)
Xiτ
] − ai − +∞∑
t=
w
(
K∗t
)∏t
τ=
[
R
(
K∗τ
)
Xiτ
] ,(b)
b =
n∑
i=
Ti,(c)
b = R
(
K∗
)
b − R
(
K∗
) n∑
i=
(
−Xi
)(
ai + T
i

)
.(d)
For t > , the sequence
{
bt
}
is defined by
bt+ = R
(
K∗t
)
bt − R
(
K∗t
) n∑
i=
(
−Xit
)
ait,()
for the sequence
{
ait
}
that is recursively defined through:
ai = R
(
K∗
)
Xi
(
ai + T
i

)
+ w
(
K∗
)− ci∗ ,(a)
ait+ = R
(
K∗t
)
Xitait + w
(
K∗t
)− ci∗t , t > .(b)
(ii) At the long-run stationary state, the most patient agent will be taxed and the most
impatient agent will be subsidized according to X <  and X > .
The selection of the taxation parameters Xit on the capital stock ensures that the marginal
rate of substitution of agent i between periods t− and t corresponds to the optimal ratio
between these two periods:
∀ i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, Du
i
(
ci∗t
)
Dui
(
ci∗t−
) = DW∆(K∗t+)
DW∆
(
K∗t
) ·
The initial transfers defined by (b) allow the agents to finance their optimal consumption
trajectory
(
ci∗t
)
over their lifespan. The debt defined in (c) and (d) in turn allows the
financing of such transfers in a distortionary taxation environment.
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It is worth mentioning that the amount of tax/subsidy Xit that is defined by (a) does
generally depend upon time. However, this is not any longer the case in the examples anal-
ysed by sections III. 1 and III.2 and that lead to homogeneous formulations for DW∆
(
K∗t
)
and DW
(
K∗t
)
. More explicitly and in Example III.1, it is obtained that
Xit = X
i
=

δi
∑
j= λjδj/
(
− αδj
)∑
j= λj/
(
− αδj
) ·
Further, and for the special case where agents have the same instantaneous utility and
where the social planner puts equal weights on the agents, it is possible to recover the
temporally-consistent stationary state through a system of non-linear taxes and transfers
on the capital stock. In this case, all agents benefit from the same amount of consumption
c∗ at the steady state. Their wealth is then given by (b):
ai =
c∗ − w(K∗)
R
(
K∗
)
Xi − 
.
Further noting that (a) implies that R
(
K∗
)
Xi = /δi, we finally obtain that:
ai =
c∗ − w(K∗)
/δi −  ,
from which it follows that:
a > a > · · · > an.
In other words, it is possible to decentralize the optimum via a nonlinear system of taxes
and transfers on the capital stock.
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VI. Proofs
VI.1 Proof of Lemma II.1
Proof: The consumption policy functions are implicitly defined through:
λiDui
[
θiC
(
Kt
)]
= DW∆
[
F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
θiC
(
Kt
)]
.
All of the functions Dui(·) and DW∆(·) being however of class C, θiC
(
Kt
)
has this same
property. Further differentiating with respect to Kt, produces:
(A.) λiDθiC
(
Kt
)
Dui
[
θiC
(
Kt
)]
= DW∆
[
θK
(
Kt
)][
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)−
n∑
i=
DθiC
(
Kt
)]
.
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Simplifying the notation as:
χi = DθiC
(
Kt
)
,
βi = λi
Dui
[
ϑiC
(
Kt
)]
DW∆
[
θK
(
Kt
)] > ,
ζ = DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η) > ,
the preceding equation (A.) is
(A.) χi = ζ/βi − /βi
n∑
j=
χj .
Summing over i:
n∑
i=
χi
(
+
n∑
i=

βi
)
= ζ
n∑
i=

βi
.
Finally:
n∑
i=
χi =
ζ
∑n
i=(/β
i)
+
∑n
i=(/β
i)
.
Integrating into (A.), it is obtained that:
βiχi = ζ− ζ
∑n
i=(/β
i)
+
∑n
i=(/β
i)
=
ζ
+
∑n
i=(/β
i)
.
The inequality χi >  will then always hold, as ζ >  and, from the concavity assumptions,
βi >  for any i ∈ {, , . . . , n}. From equation (A.), it can then be seen that DθK
(
Kt
)
> .
Q.E.D
VI.2 Proof of Proposition II.1
Proof: (i) The envelope condition (c) together with the expressions for DW∆(K) and DW(K)
in (f) and (e) produce, making use of (d) and (g), a generalized definition of the
long-run stationary value of the capital stock:
{ n∑
i=
λiδiDui
[
θiC(K)
]
DθiC(K)
− δi
[
DKF(K, ) + − η−
∑n
j= Dθ
j
C(K)
]}[DKF(K, ) + (− η)]
=
{ n∑
i=
λiDui
[
θiC(K)
]
DθiC(K)
− δi
[
DKF(K, ) + − η−
∑n
j= Dθ
j
C(K)
]}.
However, taking advantage of the fact that, for any i ∈ {, . . . , n}, λiDui
[
Ci(K)
]
=
DW∆(K), the above expression may be simplified as:
{ n∑
i=
δiDθiC(K)
− δi
[
DKF(K, ) + − η−
∑n
j= Dθ
j
C(K)
]}[DKF(K, ) + (− η)](A.)
=
{ n∑
i=
DθiC(K)
− δi
[
DKF(K, ) + − η−
∑n
j= Dθ
j
C(K)
]}.
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We then have a generalized modified golden rule in which all of the discount factors
come into play.
(ii) It however remains to show that this expression defines a value of ζ := DKF(K, ) +−η
such that ζ ∈ ]/δ, /δn[. Equation (A.) may be restated in an implicit form H(ζ) = :
H(ζ) :=
n∑
i=
(
ζ− /δi
)
δiDθiC(K)
− δi
[
ζ−∑ni= DθiC(K)]
Lemma II.1 establishes that, for any i ∈ {, . . . , n}, DθiC(K) > , hence: ∑ni= DθiC(K) > .
The denominator of the elements of the sum on the R.H.S. of the expression for H(ζ) is
positive since it comes from that in (d), and DJi(K) >  for any i ∈ {, , . . . , n}. Hence,
and for any i ∈ {, , . . . , n},
− δi
[
ζ−
n∑
j=
DθjC(K)
]
> .
or
ζ <
n∑
j=
DθjC(K) +

δi
,
the only relevant constraint being the most restrictive one, i.e.:
ζ <
n∑
j=
DθjC(K) +

δ
.
Taking as given the values of DθiC, i ∈ {, }, the function H(ζ) is monotonic increasing. It
can further be noted that, for ζ = /δ, we have H
(
/δ
)
< , ζ thus needing to be greater
than /δ.
On the contrary, for ζ = /δn, two separate configurations may arise and are considered
separately.
a/ /δn <
∑n
i= DθiC(K) + /δ: here H
(
/δn
)
>  and the existence and uniqueness of a
ζ ∈ ]/δ, /δn[ such that H(ζ) =  both hold;
b/ /δn >
∑n
i= DθiC(K) + /δ: letting then ζ =
∑n
i= DθiC(K) + /δ, with ζ < /δn,
as limζ→ζ− → +∞, there then exists a value ζ ∈
]
/δ, ζ
[
such that H(ζ) = .
The existence argument for H(ζ) =  thus holds for the entire interval of values for δi, which
of the result. Q.E.D.
VI.3 Proof of Proposition III.1
Proof: (i) The payoff functions for the two individuals are conjectured to have the following
form:
Ji(K) = ailn(K) + bi,
for ai > . The decision rules for the two individuals are the solutions of the following
program:
W
(
Kt
)
= max
{cit}
{ ∑
i=
λiln
(
cit
)
+
∑
i=
λiδiailn
(
Kt+
)
s.t. Kt+ = A
(
Kt
)α − ∑
i=
cit.
}
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The first-order conditions are then:
λi
cit
=
∑
i= λiδiai
A
(
Kt
)α −∑i= cit , i ∈ {, }·
(ii) These two equations in turn allow the consumption decision rules to be derived as:
cit =
λiA
(
Kt
)α
+ μ
,
with μ =
∑
i=
λiδiai,
from which we have the investment decision rule:
Kt+ = A
(
Kt
)α μ
+ μ
.
These decision rules allow us to calculate the payoff functions J and J for the individual
agents:
Ji
(
Kt
)
=
+∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τln(cit+τ)
=
+∞∑
τ=
[(
δi
)τ
αln
(
Kt+τ
)
+
(
δi
)τln( λiA
+ μ
)]
.
Letting χt := ln
(
Kt
)
, from the decision rule for investment, it is derived that:
χt+τ+ = αχt+τ + ln
( Aμ
+ μ
)
.
So
J
(
Kt
)
= αχt + δα
χt +
(
δ
)
αχt + . . .+ b,
for bi some constant parameter. Finally:
Ji
(
Kt
)
= αχt
+∞∑
τ=
(
αδi
)τ
+ bi
=
α
− αδi ln
(
Kt
)
+ bi.
We then have:
ai =
α
− αδi ,
μ =
∑
i=
λiδi
α
− αδi ·
(iii) Contrary to the results in Le Van & Vailakis [13] and Becker [2], Kt as described by the
investment decision rule is monotonic and converges to a value K such that
K−α = Aμ
+ μ
,
or, rearranging:
AKα− = +
∑
i= λiαδi/
(
− αδi
)∑
i= λiαδi/
(
− αδi
) ·
Finally, this can be expressed as:
AKα− =
∑
i= λi/
(
− αδi
)∑
i= λiαδi/
(
− αδi
) ,
completing the statement. Q.E.D.
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VI.4 Proof of Proposition III.2
Proof: (i)-(ii) In order for the objectives of the two agents to remain bounded, it is further
assumed that:
(A.) sup
(
δA
(ς−)/ς
, δA
(ς−)/ς)
= δA
(ς−)/ς
< .
The payoff functions for the two individuals are then assumed to take the following shape:
Ji(K) = ai
(K)−/ς
− /ς , i ∈ {, },
for ai > . The decision rules for the two individuals are the solutions to the following
program:
W
(
Kt
)
= max
{cit}
{
λi
(
cit
)−/ς
− /ς +
∑
i=
λiδiai
(
Kt+
)(ς−)/ς
(ς− )/ς s.t. Kt+ = AKt −
∑
i=
cit
}
.
The first-order conditions are then:
λi
(
cit
)−/ς
=
∑
i=
λiδiai
(
Kt+
)−/ς
, i ∈ {, }·
Letting μ := ∑i= λiδiai, the two equations in turn allow us to derive the investment and
consumption decision rules as:
Kit+ =
AKt
+
∑
i=(λi/μ)
ς
,
cit =
(λi/μ)ςAKt
+
∑
i=(λi/μ)
ς
·
From the above, for B(μ) = +∑i=(λi/μ)ς:
Kt+τ =
( A
B(μ)
)τ
Kt;
cit+τ =
(
λi
μ
)ς( A
B(μ)
)τ+
Kt, i ∈ {, }.
The knowledge of the decision rules allows us to calculate the payoff functions J(·) and J(·)
for the individual agents:
Ji
(
Kt
)
=
+∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τ (cit+τ)−/ς
− /ς
=

− /ς
(
λi
μ
)ς−(
Kt
)−/ς( A
B(μ)
)(ς−)/ς +∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τ( A
B(μ)
)τ(ς−)/ς
where the convergence of the sum on the R.H.S. requires that
(A.) δi
( A
B(μ)
)(ς−)/ς
< , i ∈ {, }.
The payoff of agent i ∈ {, } is then:
Ji
(
Kt
)
=

− /ς
(
λi
μ
)ς−(
Kt
)−/ς( A
B(μ)
)(ς−)/ς

− δi(A/B(μ))(ς−)/ς
·
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Comparing the two terms for J i(Kt), we then have
ai =
(
λi
μ
)(ς−)/ς( A
B(μ)
)(ς−)/ς

− δi(A/B(μ))(ς−)/ς
·
As μ = ∑i= λiδiai, the coefficient μ is implicitly defined as a solution to:
μ =
∑
i=
λiδi
(
λi
μ
)ς−
(A/B(μ))(ς−)/ς
− δi(A/B(μ))(ς−)/ς
,
with B(μ) = +∑i=(λi/μ)ς. Rearranging, this becomes:
 =
∑
i=
(
λi
μ
)ς δi
(B(μ)/A)(ς−)/ς − δi
·
Rearranging
(A.) μς =
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς δi
(B(μ)/A)(ς−)/ς − δi
.
In order to analyse the μ-solutions of this equation, two separate configurations are then
considered according to whether ς ∈ ], [ or ς ∈ ],+∞[.
a/ ς ∈ ], [. For ς ∈ ], [, the conditions (A.) are jointly equivalent to:
B(μ) < inf
(
δς/(ς−) A, δς/(ς−) A
)
= δς/(ς−) A,
where δς/(ς−) A >  is derived from equation (A.). The coefficient B(μ) being further-
more a decreasing monotonic function of μ, denoted B(μ), that satisfies B(+) = +∞
and B(+∞) = , consider a finite value μ¯ ∈ ],+∞[ defined by B
(
μ¯
)
= A
(
δ
)ς/(ς−),
that in turn yields:
B(μ) < A
(
δ
)ς/(ς−) ⇐⇒ μ > μ¯.
We then require a coefficient μ that satisfies μ > μ¯ and solves equation (A.), the
latter being reformulated as H(μ) = H(μ). Over the interval
]
μ¯,+∞
[
, H(·) is
monotonically increasing from H(μ¯) to +∞. On the contrary, H(·) is monotonically
decreasing from +∞ to
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς δi
A(−ς)/ς − δi
,
from which the existence and uniqueness of μ results. The existence and uniqueness of
μ =
∑
i λiδiai being established, the expressions of ai, i ∈ {, } are
ai =
(
λi
μ
)(ς−)/ς( A
B(μ)
)(ς−)/ς

− δi(A/B(μ))(ς−)/ς
.
b/ ς ∈ ],+∞[. The conditions (A.) are jointly equivalent to:
B(μ) > max
(
δς/(ς−) A, δς/(ς−) A
)
= δς/(ς−) A,
where δς/(ς−) A <  is derived from equation (A.). Further noting that the coefficient
B(μ) satisfies B(μ) >  for any μ, this condition holds everywhere. We can restate
equation (A.) as
 =
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς
μς
δi[
+
∑
i=(λi/μ)
ς
](ς−)/ς
(/A)(ς−)/ς − δi
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And then state it as:
 =
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς δi
μ
[
μς +
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς](ς−)/ς
(/A)(ς−)/ς − δiμς
·
We then have to prove that the function
(A.) f(μ) = μ
(
μς + b
)(ς−)/ς
a
− δiμς, i ∈ {, },
increases in μ, for b = ∑i=(λi)ς and a = A(ς−)/ς. Its derivative is
Df(μ) =
(
μς + b
)−/ς
a
(
ςμς + b
)− δiςμς−.
Recalling that, for any i ∈ {, }, δia < , we have:
Df(μ) > 
a
[(
μς + b
)−/ς(
ςμς + b
)− ςμς−].
We wish to establish that
(
μς + b
)−/ς(
ςμς + b
)− ςμς− > ; this is equivalent to:
ςμς + b− ςμς−(μς + b)/ς > .
Letting ψ(b) = ςμς + b − ςμς−(μς + b)/ς, it is readily obtained that ψ() =  and
Dψ(b) =  − μς−(μς + b)/ς−. Noting that (μς + b)(ς−)/ς > μς− results from
μς + b > μς, we eventually have that Dψ(b) >  and ψ(b) >  for any b > .
It has hence been established that f(·) increases in μ. The R.H.S. of (A.) is a mono-
tonic function that falls from +∞ to  as μ rises from  to +∞, which establishes the
existence and uniqueness of μ.
(iii) Consider the following problem:
max
{cit}
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)t (cit)−/ς
(− /ς) s.t. Kt+ = AKt −
∑
i=
cit, K given.
The dynamic Lagrangean is
Lt =
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)t (cit)−/ς
(− /ς) + μt+
(
AKt −
∑
i=
cit
)− μtKt.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal trajectory are:
μt = Aμt+,
λi
(
δi
)t(
cit
)−/ς
= μt+, i ∈ {, },
Kt+ = AKt −
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςt
μt+
−ς,
μt+ =
μt
A
,
lim
t→+∞ μtKt = .
Letting kt = Kt/A
t, the last three conditions can be rewritten as:
kt+ = kt −
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςtA(ς−)(t+)(μ)−ς
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μt =

At
μ,
lim
t→+∞ ktμ = .
For a given μ, the last equation implies that limt→+∞ ktμ = . Noting then that kt+ can
be rewritten as, after iteration:
kt = K −
(
μ
)−ς t−∑
τ=
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςτA(ς−)(τ+),
taking limits and from limt→+∞ ktμ = , we obtain:
K =
(
μ
)−ς +∞∑
τ=
∑
i=
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςτA(ς−)(τ+).
It is then possible, for a fixed µ, to rewrite cit =
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςtAς(t+)(μ), i ∈ {, }, as
cit =
(
λi
)ς(
δi
)ςtAς(t+)K−ς∑+∞
τ=
∑
j=
(
λj
)ς(
δj
)ςτA(ς−)(τ+) , i ∈ {, }.
In other words, cit grows at a rate of
(
δiA
)ς, so that the consumption growth are different
for δ 6= δ. Q.E.D.
VI.5 Proof of Proposition III.3
Proof: (i) Consider the problem
max
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)tln(cit) s.t. ∑
i=
cit + Kt+ = AKt,K given.
The dynamic Lagrangean is
Lt =
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)tln(cit)+ μt+(AKt − ∑
i=
cit
)− μtKt.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal trajectory are:
λi
(
δi
)t
cit
= μt+, i ∈ {, },
(A.a)
μt = Aμt+,
(A.b)
lim
t→+∞ μtKt = .
(A.c)
Using the resource constraint together with equation (A.a), we have:
Kt+ = AKt −
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)t
μt+
.(A.)
From (A.b), μt = μ/A
t. Letting kt = Kt/A
t, equations (A.c) and (A.) can be rewritten
as:
kt+ = kt −
∑
i= λi
(
δi
)t
μ
,
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lim
t→+∞ ktμ = .
We have:
kt = kt− −
∑
i= λi
(
δi
)t−
μ
= k − μ
t−∑
τ=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)τ
.
Recalling that limt→+∞ μkt = , we obtain:
μk =
+∞∑
τ=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)τ
,
from which
μ =
∑+∞
τ=
∑
i= λi
(
δi
)τ
k
=

k
∑
i=
λi
− δi .
Maximum utility is given by:
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)tln[λi(δi)t
μt+
]
=
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)tln(λi)+ +∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)t
t ln
(
δi
)
+
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)t
(t+ )ln(A)−
+∞∑
t=
∑
i=
λi
(
δi
)tln(μ).
=
∑
i
∆i +
∑
i=
Mi +
∑
i
Γi −
∑
i
Γ′i.
After some simplifications:
∆i =
+∞∑
t=
λi
(
δi
)tln(λi)
=
λiln
(
λi
)
− δi ;
Mi =
+∞∑
t=
λi
(
δi
)t
t ln
(
δi
)
= λi ln
(
δi
)+∞∑
t=
(
δi
)t
t
= λi ln
(
δi
) δi(
− δi
) ;
Γi =
+∞∑
t=
λi
(
δi
)t
(t+ )ln(A)
=
λiln(A)
− δi + λiln(A)
δi(
− δi
)
=
λiln(A)(
− δi
) ;
Γ′i = −
+∞∑
t=
λi
(
δi
)tln(μ)
xxiii 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.82
= −λiln
(
μ
)
− δi
=
λiln
(
k
)
− δi −
λi
− δi ln
( ∑
j=
λj
− δj
)
·
So that inter-temporal welfare is:
U =
∑
i=
λiUi,
Ui =
ln
(
λi
)
− δi + ln
(
δi
) δi(
− δi
) + ln(A)(
− δi
) + ln(k)− δi −
ln
[∑
j=
[
λj/
(
− δj
)]]
− δi .
On the contrary, the payoffs from the temporally-consistent solution come from the following
reworked system of first-order conditions:
cit+τ =
(
λi/μ
)
AKt+τ
+ /μ
=
λiAKt+τ
+ μ
=
λiA
+ μ
( A
B(μ)
)τ
,Kt
Kt+τ =
( A
B(μ)
)τ
Kt,
for B(μ) = (μ+)/μ and μ = ∑i= λiaiδi. Taking the approach of Example 1 and Proposition
III.1, the inter-temporal payoff functions are log and can be calculated as:
Ji
(
K
)
=
+∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τln[ λiA
+ μ
( A
B(μ)
)τ
K
]
;
=
ln[λiAK/(+ μ)
]
− δi +
+∞∑
τ=
(
δi
)τ
τln
( A
B(μ)
)
=
ln[λiAK/(+ μ)
]
− δi +
δi
− δi ,
from which, comparing to the conjectured Ji(K) = ailn(K) + bi, we have ai = /
(
 − δi
)
,
μ =
∑
i= λiδi/
(
− δi
)
and B(μ) = ∑i=[λi/(− δi)]/∑i=[λiδi/(− δi)].
After further calculation, the temporally-consistent payoff functions can hence be derived
as:
Ji
(
K
)
=
ln
(
K
)
− δi +
ln
(
λi
)
− δi +
ln(A)(
− δi
) − ln(+ μ)(
− δi
) + δiln(μ)(
− δi
) , i ∈ {, }·
Comparing the payoffs of the temporally-consistent and -inconsistent solutions, and first
considering the relatively patient agent, i = , we have:
J
(
K
)−U = δ(
− δ
){ln[∑j=[λjδj/(− δj)]∑
j=
[
λj/
(
− δj
)] ]− ln(δ)}
< ,
where the last inequality results from δ < δ as the expression between curly brackets can
be rewritten as λδ/
(
− δ
)
< λδ/
(
− δ
)
being negative.
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Considering then the relatively patient agent i = , it can be shown that:
J
(
K
)−U = δ(
− δ
){ln[∑j=[λjδj/(− δj)]∑
j=
[
λj/
(
− δj
)] ]− ln(δ)}
> ,
where the last inequality results from δ < δ as the expression between curly brackets can
be rewritten as λδ/
(
− δ
)
> λδ/
(
− δ
)
being positive.
Finally, considering total welfare in the economy, and letting λ = λ and λ = −λ, we have:
∑
i=
λi
[
Ji
(
K
)−Ui] = λ[J(K)−U]+ (− λ)[J(K)−U]
:= φ(λ),
where it can be noted that φ() = φ() = . Further calculations allow us to establish that
Dφ(λ) = 
(
δ − δ
)(
− δ
)(
− δ
)[
λ/
(
− δ
)
+ (− λ)/(− δ)]
×
{
(
− δ
)(
− δ
)[ δ
− δ −
δ
− δ
]}
> 
and that φ(·) is a convex function for any λ ∈ ], [. As such, and for any λ ∈ ], [, φ(λ) < .
The consideration of temporally-consistent decision rules for the welfare of the agents leads
to an overall loss of welfare. Q.E.D.
VI.6 Proof of Lemma IV.1
Proof: Consider the following generalized Lagrangian:
Lt = ∆t
n∑
i=
λiu
i
(
cit
)
+ μt+
[
F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit
]
− μtKt.
The optimality conditions derive as:
∆tλiDui
(
cit
)
= μt+,
µt = µt+
[
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ − η],
limt→+∞μtKt = .
Rearranging and eliminating the multiplier μt between these equations, it is obtained that:
λiDui
(
cit
)
= λjDuj
(
cjt
)
,
Dui
(
cit−
)
= δt−
[
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ − η]Dui(cit),
limt→+∞∆tDui
(
cit
)[
DKF
(
Kt, 
)
+ − η] = ,
Kt+ = F
(
Kt, 
)
+ (− η)Kt −
n∑
i=
cit.
The statement follows. Q.E.D.
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VI.7 Proof of Proposition IV.1
Proof: The argument of the proof proceeds by establishing that
(
K∗t , ci∗t
)
t∈ IN,i∈{,,...,n}
corresponds to a solution to the system defined by equations (a), (b), (c), (d) and
()
Equation (a) holds because
λiDui
(
ci∗t
)
= λjDuj
(
cj∗t
)
as a result of ().
Equation (b) is satisfied because the consideration of () at dates t and t−  delivers:
Dui
(
ci∗t
)
= DW∆
(
K∗t+
)
,
Dui
(
ci∗t−
)
= DW∆
(
K∗t
)
,
whence:
Dui
(
ci∗t−
)
Dui
(
ci∗t
) = DW∆(K∗t )
DW∆
(
K∗t+
) ·
Making then use of ():
Dui
(
ci∗t−
)
Dui
(
ci∗t
) = DW∆(K∗t )
DW
(
K∗t
) [DKF(K∗t , )+ − η].
As limt→+∞∆t = , Equation (c) is satisfied as soon as ci∗t , i ∈ {, , . . . , n} and K
∗
t
converge toward non-zero stationary values. Finally, Equation (d) is satisfied by construc-
tion.The statement follows. Q.E.D.
VI.8 Proof of Corollary IV.1
Proof: From Proposition II.1, it is first obtained that:
δ =
DW∆
(
K
)
DW
(
K
)
=
∑
i= αδiλi/
(
− αδi
)∑
i= αλi/
(
− αδi
)
=
∑
i= δiλi/
(
− αδi
)∑
i= λi/
(
− αδi
) ·
It is further clear that the value function of the planner’s program
(
P
)
, denoted as Wp
(
K
)
,
assumes the following form:
Wp
(
K
)
= νln
(
K
)
+ b.
It satisfies the Bellman equation:
Wp
(
Kt
)
= max
{cit,Kt}
∑
i=
ln
(
cit
)
+ δWp
(
Kt+
)
s.t. Kt+ = A
(
Kt
)α − ∑
i=
cit.
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The first order conditions of this program restate as:
cit =
λiKt+
δν
.
Replacing into the resource constraint, it is obtained that:
Kt+ =
δν
+ δν
A
(
Kt
)α
,
cit =
λi
+ δν
A
(
Kt
)α
.
The analytical formulation of the value function of the planner’s program can then be com-
puted to:
Wp
(
Kt
)
=
+∞∑
τ=
δτ
[
αln
(
Kt+τ
)
+
∑
i=
λiln
(
λi
+ δν
)]
.
It is finally obtained that:
Wp
(
Kt
)
=
α
− αδ ln
(
Kt
)
+ b,
where b is a constant term. In order to check that Wp
(
Kt
)
= W
(
Kt
)
, it then suffices to
check that:
α
− αδ =
∑
i=
αλi
− αδi ·
It is first noticed that this equation equivalently reformulates to:

− αδ =
∑
i=
λi
− αδi ,
or

− α∑i=[λiδi/(− αδi)] / ∑i=[λi/(− αδi)] =
∑
i=
λi
− αδi ,
whence
∑
i=
[
λi/
(
− αδi
)]− α∑i=[λiδi/(− αδi)] = ,
or
∑
i=
λi(− αδi)
− αδi = .
Finally, ∑i= λi = , that holds under the assumptions of the model. Q.E.D.
VI.9 Proof of Proposition V.1
Proof: (i) The argument of the proof is developed by establishing that any of the conditions
(a) –(k) are satisfied when Kt = K
∗
t , cit = ci∗t for any i ∈ {, , . . . , n}, t ∈ IN and with
the policy instruments defined by equations (a)-(b), (c)-(d), (), and (a)-(b)
Equation (a) can be shown to be satisfied from the definition of Xit: making use of ()
considered at date t− , it is readily seen that
Dui
(
ci∗t
)
Dui
(
ci∗t−
) = DW∆(K∗t+)
DW∆
(
K∗t
) ·
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Appealing to the envelope condition (), the R.H.S. of the above equation can be rewritten
as:
DW∆
(
K∗t+
)
DW∆
(
K∗t
) = DW
(
K∗t
)
DW∆
(
K∗t
) R(K∗t ) ,
hence, finally:
Dui
(
ci∗t
)
Dui
(
ci∗t−
) = 
Xitδi

R
(
K∗t
) ,
which results in (a).
Equations (b) and (c) hold from the construction of the argument, the coefficient Ti
being defined in order for (d) to hold. Equations (e), (g) and (h) are similarly
satisfied from the structure of the argument, while (h) corresponds to the resource con-
straint of the economy. While equation (j) is satisfied from the structure of the argument,
equation (i) can be established through a recursive argument. By date t = , making use
of equation (c), can be shown that:
n∑
i=
ai = R
(
K∗
) n∑
i=
Xi
(
ai + T
i

)
+ DLF
(
K∗, 
)− n∑
i=
ci.
Subtracting (g) from the above equation yields:
n∑
i=
ai − b = R
(
K∗
) n∑
i=
(
ai + T
i

)− R(K∗)b + DLF(K∗, )− n∑
i=
ci∗ ,
which in turn can be rewritten, making use of ∑ni=(ai + Ti) = K∗ + b derived from (j),
as:
n∑
i=
ai − b = R
(
K∗
)(
K∗ + b
)− R(K∗)b + DLF(K∗, )− n∑
i=
ci∗ .
Finally:
n∑
i=
ai − b = F
(
K∗, 
)
+ (− η)K∗ −
n∑
i=
ci∗
= K∗.
Such a line of argumentation can then be extended between period t and period t + .
Equation (k) finally prevails from the building of the argument.
(ii) Consider the stationary state
(
K∗, ci∗
)
that is associated with capital taxation instru-
ments Xi, i ∈ {, , . . . , n}. Equation (a) then reformulates to:
Xiδi =

R
(
K∗
) .
From Proposition II.1, it is derived that:
δn <

R
(
K∗
)
< δ,
whence the asserted holding of X <  and Xn > . Q.E.D.
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